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Abstract 
In the post-World War II world economic order, international economic relations have 
conventionally been regarded as an area reserved for state-to-state relations and to some 
extent global administrative actors (international and regional organisations).  
However, with the advent and spread of globalisation, there has been a progressive departure 
from traditional paradigms, which dictate the patterns of interaction in the international 
economic system. Essentially, globalisation has challenged the sovereignty status quo of 
Westphalian statehood by disaggregating traditional governance structures and encouraging 
the emergence of new ones (sub-national and non-state actors).  
Focusing specifically on the international trade process (i.e. negotiation and implementation 
of international trade deals), there appears to be no uniformity in the theoretical 
conceptualisation of the role for sub-national actors within the international trade system. At 
present, sub-national governments enjoy varied degrees of acceptance within the various 
frameworks for international trade interactions of their home states. This is mainly due to the 
reality that there is a growing intersection between subnational, national and international 
policy arenas, making the policy space increasingly difficult to neatly delineate. As such, 
even with more States making adjustments to accommodate sub-national governments in 
their international trade processes, it is questionable if there is any coherent pattern 
discernable from these case studies. More so, with international norms still opposed to the 
participation of sub-national actors in the international scene, most of the actions taken by 
these actors are classified as ‘wholly domestic policies’, which their central governments are 
mandated to ensure are in conformity with international obligations. This has made the 
mapping and understanding of sub-national government’s activities in the foreign sphere 
difficult to coherently conceptualise.  
Focusing on Belgium and Canada, this paper seeks to ascertain: whether there is any 
coherence deducible in the way we conceptualise emerging patterns of engagement by sub-
national actors in international trade relations. 
To answer this research question, this paper evaluates the current status of sub-national actors 
in the international trade interactions of two federal systems - Belgium and Canada. These 
two countries have been selected for appraisal because they have adopted distinctively 
dissimilar models for assimilating the participation of sub-national actors into their 
international trade interactions.  
The central argument in this paper is that the emerging discourse on sub-national 
participation in international trade interactions of federal systems is progressively developing 
into coherent themes. It will be argued that these themes are emerging irrespective of the 
differing domestic constitutional settings in which sub-national actors are operating.  
 
 
  
3 
 
 
1.1 Introduction  
In the 21st century, the core disciplines of international economic interactions (i.e. trade, 
investment and finance) which were erstwhile reserved exclusively for state-to-state 
regulation have over the years opened up to an ever increasing array of global administrative 
actors (international and regional organisations), sub-national actors and non-state actors 
(civil societies). With the changing dynamics, international and regional organisations have 
found it relatively easier than sub-national governments and civil societies to gain acceptance 
as legitimate actors in international relations. The former used the mandate acquired from 
States as a spring board to progressively gain prominence on the international stage, while the 
latter have struggled to break into the fold mainly because they do not conform to the 
recognised hierarchy of Westphalian statehood. 
In relation to sub-national actors (which is the focus of this paper),2 their engagement in 
international economic relations is deeply grounded in a history of scepticism.3 However, in 
recent times, central governments are finding it increasingly difficult to ignore the input of 
these actors during implementation and more recently negotiation of international economic 
agreements.4 This is because international economic agreements, most notably new styled 
mega-regional Free trade Agreements (FTAs) have more far reaching effects on societies 
than ever before. For instance, It has been well documented in the media that sub-national 
governments (all levels of sub-national governments) and non-state actors (individuals and 
civil societies) around the world are growing increasingly concerned about the impact of 
mega regional FTAs such as the Trans-Atlantic Trade Partnership (TTP), the Tran-Atlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic 
                                                            
2 ‘Sub-national actors’ is used in the context of sub-national governments/regions/provinces and municipalities. 
 
3 For a better part of the 20th century, the participation of sub-national actors in international relations was 
perceived to be unpredictable and in some instances disruptive of the existing status quo. See KC Wheare, 
Federal Government (4th ed OUP 1963) 183- 186; Ivan Bernier, International Legal Aspects of Federalism 
(Longman 1973) 1-6.  
 
4 Ordinarily, negotiation comes before implementation, however, implementation has conventionally been an 
area of sub-national participation because, sub-national divisions are closer to the grassroots where 
implementation of policy takes place. What is considered abnormal is when sub-national governments become 
involved in negotiation of, and or sign international economic agreements.  
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Trade Agreement (CETA). As such, there has been sustained criticism and activism against 
the negotiation and implementation of these economic agreements.5   
In view of these changing protocols, there has been a noticeable shift in the perception of 
central governments and global administrative organisations about sub-national engagement 
in foreign economic activities. Although this changing paradigm is still at its infancy, it is 
gaining traction among federal countries. Notably, established federal systems such as 
Canada, Belgium, India, Argentina and the USA out of necessity and/or pragmatism are 
adapting their international economic regimes to accommodate the input of these 
stakeholders (albeit to varying degrees, using different institutional mechanisms).6  
Interestingly, even with more States making accommodation for sub-national governments in 
their international trade processes, it is questionable if there is any coherent pattern 
discernable from these case studies. Notably, there is ambivalence in the way these actors are 
conceptualised in international economic law. This is mainly because there is a dichotomy 
between the recognition of these actors within the applicable laws (i.e. international 
conventions, multilateral and regional trade agreements) in the international fora and the 
emerging framework for accommodating their interests within domestic national law. This 
has led to distinct variations in the methods and scope of domestic accommodation for sub-
national engagement in foreign economic activities across-board. Ordinarily the existence of 
variations in domestic accommodation mechanisms is expected due to the differences in the 
way each country is politically set up. However, the challenge with this approach is that there 
is the propensity to isolate these occurrences as purely domestic measures that have no 
implications or connections with what happens on the international scene. With such a 
                                                            
5 See Par Roosevelt Namur, ‘Good news! The war on TTIP and CETA can be won’ Pour Écrire la Liberté  
[blog site] (May 10 2016)  available at <http://www.pour.press/good-news-the-war-on-ttip-and-ceta-can-be-
won/> accessed  15 September 2016; Helena Spongenberg, ‘European cities and regions rally to stop TTIP’ 
(April 25 2016) available at https://euobserver.com/regions/133173  accessed  15 September 2016. The central 
grouse in these publications is that sub-national governments and civil societies are concerned that new mega 
regional FTAs are not being negotiated transparently and that there is lack of clarity on the scope of powers that 
these agreements would give to international corporations at the expense of small and medium-sized businesses. 
6 For example, the Forum of Federations conducted a comprehensive study of the changing constitutional and 
institutional role of sub-national governments in foreign interactions of federal systems in 2007.  This study 
selected 12 federal systems for appraisal. This study was part of a series themed ‘A Global Dialogue on 
Federalism.’ The countries selected for appraisal on the topic of foreign relations were Argentina, Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, India, Malaysia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States. 
See Hans Michelmann (ed) A Global Dialogue on Federalism: Foreign Relations in Federal Countries, Vol 5 
(McGill-Queen's University Press 2006). 
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perception, there is a danger of assuming that the status quo in international law where sub-
national governments have no business in foreign activities remains unchallenged. In theory, 
the existing international rules have not undergone any significant changes to accommodate 
sub-national actors, but in reality the impact of sub-national policy on international law is 
more pronounced than ever.  
As such, this paper is seeking to investigate: if in the multiplicity of domestic accommodation 
mechanisms emerging in different federal systems there are commonalities discernible in the 
patterns of engagement by sub-national actors in international economic relations. 
To answer this research question, this paper evaluates the current status of sub-national actors 
in the international trade interactions of two federal systems - Belgium and Canada. These 
two countries have been selected for appraisal because they are both federal countries, which 
have adopted distinctively dissimilar models for assimilating the participation of sub-national 
actors into their international trade interactions. Canada is very informal and flexible; on the 
other hand Belgium is more formal and institutionalised. Thus, it would be interesting to see 
if there are any commonalities that link both countries, which in turn can be projected as 
distinct themes that can help with broader interpretations and understanding of the 
phenomenon.  
The central argument of this paper is that in the emerging discourse on sub-national 
participation in international economic interactions of federal systems, there are areas of 
commonality discernible, irrespective of the differing domestic constitutional settings in 
which sub-national actors are operating in these two countries. The analysis in this paper 
would show that even though the experiences in Canada and Belgium may be different 
(especially in terms of the levels of formalism associated with sub-national activity in 
international trade interactions), their areas of commonality, should not go unnoticed because 
they are crucial to a holistic conceptualisation of the evolving role of these actors in the 21st 
century international trade process. 
1.2 Contextualising the analysis: Federal countries and the conventional norm on sub-
national engagement in international relations 
Federal systems have always been at the forefront of the controversies surrounding sub-
national participation in international relations.7 This is because historically, international law 
                                                            
7 See Bernier, (n 3) 1-6; Wheare, (n 3). 
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responded to the appearance of federal states by ignoring their constitutional peculiarities and 
sought to treat them like other sovereign states.8 In line with this approach, the general rule 
which has existed in international law for the better part of the Westphalian era of statehood 
is that federal systems have a responsibility to ensure that the acts or omissions of their sub-
national  governments do not infringe on international law obligations which the State is 
subject to.9 This responsibility is not negated even in situations where the internal law of a 
federal system does not give the central government powers to compel its sub-national 
governments. 10  This obligation applies as the default rule unless a contrary intention is 
evidenced in the text of an international treaty.11 In some instances, international treaties have 
‘opt out’ clauses negotiated into them.12 This can operate by way of federal state clauses,13 
which make it possible for federal systems to expressly escape liability if their sub-national 
governments do not comply with the requirements of a treaty in areas where they have 
constitutional competence to act.14 
1.2.1 Sub-national compliance under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) 
In the context of the multilateral framework for international trade, the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and subsequently the World Trade Organisation (WTO) practices 
                                                            
8 Brenier aptly describes the nature of this relationship as one of ‘attraction-repulsion.’ Bernier (n 7) 1. 
9 ibid 6; Edward T Hayes, ‘Changing Notions of Sovereignty and Federalism in the International Economic 
System: A Reassessment of WTO Regulation of Federal States and the Regional and Local Governments within 
their Territories’ (2004) 25(1) Nw J Intl L & Bus 1, 20. See also art 27 – 29, Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties 1969 UN Doc A/CONF 39/27.  
10 Hayes (n 9); art 29 Vienna Convention (n 9).  
11 Hayes (n 10) 20. 
12 Bernier (n 9) 171. 
13 ibid.  
14 Hayes opines that the first question to ask when examining international regulation of federal nation/states is 
whether the treaty language evidences an intention to ‘opt out’ of the default rule of nation/state responsibility 
for sub-national governments. See Hayes (n 11) 20. See generally Robert B Looper, ‘‘Federal State’ Clauses in 
Multilateral Instruments’ (1960) U Ill L F 375; Yuen-Li Liang, ‘Colonial Clauses and Federal Clauses in United 
Nations Multilateral Instruments’ (1951) 45 AJIL108.  
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have over the years attempted to fill the gap left by the absence of a general customary 
international law rule specifying the required measures.15  
Tracing the GATT/WTO practices to the early years of the post-WW2 era, Brenier points out 
that at the inception of multilateral cooperation in international relations, the scope of 
international law was widening and the emerging international instruments during this period 
started taking into consideration the peculiar problems posed by federal systems.16 Thus, the 
potential conflict arising from the possibility that sub-national governments in federal 
systems could act at cross purposes with the treaty obligations of the federal system was 
foreseen during the negotiation process for the new multilateral trade order in the aftermath 
of WW2.17 During the 1946 GATT and ITO preparatory session within the UN, the challenge 
posed by federal systems on compliance with the proposed GATT was apparent because a 
number of proposals were put forward by negotiating parties such as Australia and the US, 
seeking to ensure that compliance by federal systems was guaranteed.18 
Hayes reports that: 
…in response to these concerns, the [UN] technical subcommittee recommended the 
addition of a clause to the National Treatment article [of the proposed GATT] requiring 
contracting parties to take ‘all measures’ open to them to ensure that taxes and other 
regulations by subsidiary governments within their territories did not impair the 
objectives of the national treatment article.19   
The reference to ‘all measures’ in the proposal of the technical committee was later modified 
‘to require each government to “take such reasonable measures as may be available to it” to 
ensure observance by subsidiary governments.’20 Furthermore, the ‘federal clause’ was an 
add note to a general miscellaneous article presumably in view of the fact that the issue of 
                                                            
15 Interestingly, although customary international law imposes this default obligation on federal systems, there is 
no general customary international law rule which stipulates what measure(s), if any; central governments must 
take to seek compliance of its sub-national governments at the local level.   
16 Bernier (n 13) 1. 
17 Hayes (n 14) 20. 
18 ibid 21. 
19 ibid 22.  
20 ibid. 
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federal compliance with the proposed multilateral trade agreement affected not only the 
National Treatment provision but also other substantive provisions of the then proposed 
GATT.21  
1.2.2 The current position under art XXIV: 12 of the GATT 
The current position on federal compliance with the WTO/GATT system is expressed in art 
XXIV: 12 of the GATT.  It provides that ‘each contracting party shall take such reasonable 
measures as may be available to it to ensure observance of the provisions of this Agreement 
by the regional and local governments and authorities within its territories.’22 Jackson and 
Hayes identify that ‘the language of art XXIV: 12 descended directly from language in the 
draft ITO Charter.'23In addition to art XXIV: 12, there are similar provisions across the 
GATT/WTO agreements which are modelled after art XXIV: 12.24  
The issues relating to the application and effect of federal systems’ compliance with 
GATT/WTO agreements did not disappear, even with the final agreed version of art XXIV: 
12 which was inserted in the GATT 1947. Rather, the historical evolution of this federal 
compliance clause was marked by unresolved ambiguities regarding the extent and scope of 
the obligations imposed on federal nation/states to secure compliance by their sub-national 
governments.25  
For example, during the GATT years of the multilateral trade system (i.e. before the 
introduction of the WTO) some interpretations suggested that the effect and scope of 
‘reasonable measures’ under art XXIV: 12 were not intended to be compelling or mandatory 
for the contracting parties to the GATT.26 One interpretation suggested by Jackson was that 
art XXIV: 12 did not apply to measures of sub-national governments which are 
                                                            
21 JH Jackson, ‘The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law’ (1967) 66 (2) 
Mich L Rev 249, 304-306. 
22 ibid. 
23 Hayes (n 18) 21; Jackson (1967) (n 22) 304. 
24 For example, art 2.2 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (1994); art XVI (4) Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the WTO; art 13 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(1994); arts 3.1, 3.4 and 3.5 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (1994); art 1.3(a) General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (1994). 
25 Hayes (n 21) 20-23. 
26 Jackson (1967) (n 23) 302. 
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constitutionally beyond the powers of the central government. As such, the central 
government was not in breach of its international obligations if a sub-national government in 
the exercise of such powers contravened an international obligation, as long as the central 
government did everything within its power to ensure local observance of GATT.27 Another 
interpretation suggested by Jackson was to the effect that the provision of art XXIV: 12 ‘was 
not intended to apply as a matter of law against local subdivisions at all, and even when the 
central government has legal power to require local observance of GATT it is not obligated 
under GATT to do so but merely to take reasonable measures.’28  
During the GATT Uruguay Round which cumulated in the introduction of the WTO, 
negotiating parties sought to clarify the inherent ambiguities in art XXIV: 12 by adopting an 
Understanding on the Interpretation of art XXIV of the GATT 1994. The key point in ‘The 
Understanding’ concerning the scope of federal compliance under art XXIV: 12 is that ‘Each 
Member is fully responsible for the observance of all provisions of the GATT 1994, and shall 
take such reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure such observance by 
regional and local governments and authorities within its territory.'29 The Understanding also 
stipulated that the provisions of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) ‘may be 
invoked in respect of measures affecting its observance by regional or local governments or 
authorities within the territory of a Member.’30  
Hayes argues that inasmuch as the ‘Understanding on art XXIV: 12 clarifies the 
responsibility of all GATT/WTO federal nation/states for the non-conforming behavior of 
their component units under the GATT/WTO, it leaves open the question of what constitutes 
‘reasonable measures’ to seek compliance.’ 31  According to him, ‘This is a particularly 
important question to consider in areas that fall within exclusive regional or local 
authority.’32 Therefore, he is of the view that ‘despite the Uruguay Round Understanding on 
art XXIV: 12, the extent of federal nation/state obligations under art XXIV: 12 remains 
                                                            
27 ibid. 
28 ibid.  
29 Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 
XXIV:  12 13. See also Hayes (n 20) 24. 
30 Hayes (n 29) 25. 
31 ibid 25. 
32 ibid. 
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unclear and what constitutes “reasonable measures” to ensure local observance remains 
ambiguous.’33 
From the foregoing, it appears that a lack of consensus on the interpretation of what measures 
should be taken by federal countries to keep their sub-national divisions in check is a 
reflection of the general intolerance towards sub-national actors interfering with the 
international trade obligations of States in the international system. It is also an indication 
that the multilateral trade system was designed in a manner to give room for wide 
interpretations to States as to how they should handle what was considered a 
domestic/internal affair. As such, the response of each State towards growing agitations by 
sub-national divisions for improved engagement with international economic regimes has 
developed differently. This makes it increasingly difficult to coherently make sense of why 
and how these actors operate.  
In the next section, the scope of sub-national engagement in the international trade process 
will be examined through the lens of two federal case studies – Canada and Belgium.  
1.3 Sub-national participation in international trade relations: a deviation from the 
norm 
In this section of the paper, the focus would be on the changing dynamics of sub-national 
participation in the international trade mechanisms of Belgium and Canada. The analysis 
would highlight areas of constitutional and institutional changes that have occurred in the 
way sub-national governments in these two countries.  
1.3.1 Canada in focus 
Generally, the constitutional configuration of the federal system in Canada is premised on a 
relationship where the provinces have considerable autonomy from the central government in 
Ottawa.34 With regards to international economic relations, Canada’s involvement in the 
global economy has not been exclusively controlled by the central government. This is 
mainly due to the constitutional uncertainty surrounding the allocation of powers on matters 
                                                            
33 ibid 23-24. 
34  G Anderson and Andre Lecours, ‘Foreign Policy and Intergovernmental Relations in Canada’ in Hans 
Michelmann (ed) (n 6) 21. 
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of international trade relations.35 The constitutional provisions which relate to the allocation 
of powers between the central government and provinces for foreign relations include The 
Treaty-making Power, The Trade and Commerce Power, and The Peace, Order and Good 
Government (POGG) clauses in the Constitution Act, 1867.36 These constitutional provisions 
did not give the federal government explicit control over foreign policy at the time of 
Confederation.37 The only reference to the central government’s role in international relations 
under the Constitution Act, 1867 is found in s 132, which grants the Dominion the authority 
to implement treaties negotiated by Great Britain.38  
Over time, the central government’s dominance over foreign affairs expanded, however, this 
occurred alongside a concurrent rise in provincial influence.39 For example, Kukucha points 
out that in terms of treaty making, the precedent from the case Reference re: Weekly Rest in 
Industrial Undertakings Act (the “Labour Conventions” case)40 was to the effect that the 
central government had the power to negotiate international treaties; only that it did not have 
the right to implement agreements in areas of provincial jurisdiction.41 This supposes a 
dualised conceptualisation of foreign affairs in Canada. More so, in subsequent cases, the 
Supreme Court of Canada took a cautious stance and did not rely on the precedence from the 
‘Labour Convention case’ in favour of either level of government, preferring instead to 
maintain a balance between federal and provincial authority in this area. 42 This was 
presumably calculated to encourage cooperation between the central government and the 
provinces on matters of foreign relations. In relation to the scope of trade and commerce 
power available to the central government under the Constitution Act, 1867, Kukucha points 
out that while Parliament was given control over the regulation of trade and commerce by 
                                                            
35 Christopher J Kukucha, ‘Dismembering Canada? Stephen Harper and the Foreign Relations of Canadian 
Provinces’ (2009) 14 (1) Rev Const Stud 21. 
36 30 & 31 Vict c 3. 
37 Christopher J Kukucha, The Provinces and Canadian Foreign Trade Policy (UBC Press 2008) 44. 
38 Kukucha (2009) (n 35) 27. See also Bernier (n 16) 51. 
39 Kukucha (2009) (n 38). 
40 [1937] AC 326.  
41 ibid. See also France Morrissette, ‘Provincial Involvement in International Treaty Making: The European 
Union as a Possible Model’ (2012) 37 (2) Queen’s LJ 577, 583. 
42 Kukucha (2009) (n 39) 27. 
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virtue of section 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867,43 this exclusive control was in reality 
subject to limitations. The limitations arose from the fact that the provinces were granted 
jurisdiction over property and civil rights including the regulation of contracts, the effects of 
which had a significant impact on the conduct of international trade.44 
The outlook of these provisions and the interpretation given by the courts show that the 
central government has enjoyed only a slight advantage over the provinces in relation to 
foreign affairs. The provinces have capitalised on these opportunities to express themselves at 
the international level, particularly in relation to trade promotion and the opening of trade 
offices in other countries.45  
In relation to Canada’s obligations under multilateral and regional trade agreements, the 
general attitude in international law towards ensuring conformity of regions to international 
obligations has given the central government additional oversight duties over the provinces.46 
However, this responsibility on the central government has proved to be more of a burden 
than a superior advantage. This is because with the incursion of international economic 
agreements into areas of constitutional competence of the provinces, it has become 
imperative for the central government to improve on consultation mechanisms with the 
provinces.47 This is no easy task because it entails balancing competing interests of the 
various provinces, vis-à-vis the interest of the central government.  
1.3.1.1 Evolution of Provincial involvement in Canada’s international trade process 
With Canada’s involvement in the multilateral negotiations of the GATT from the onset of 
the multilateral trade system in 1947, elements of sub-national governments input began to 
emerge in form of a federal-provincial committee system. This system evolved in response to 
                                                            
43 ibid. 
44 ibid, see generally Citizens Insurance Company v. Parsons (1881) 7 App Cas 96. In this case, the Supreme 
Court of Canada did not use trade and commerce to entrench federal or provincial power. Instead, ‘it reaffirmed 
that there was no federal power to regulate a single trade or business; and, it indicated that issues...must be 
determined on a careful case by case basis.’ 
45 Kukucha (2009) (n 43) 28-35; Anderson and Lecours (n 34) 21, 22-23. 
46 Kukucha (2008) (n 37) 44. 
47 Issues of provincial interest such as services, agriculture, alcohol, government procurement, national health 
and safety standards, energy, and environment and labour now frequently come up in international trade deals.  
See Kukucha (2009) (n 45) 35.  
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‘(a) constitutional ambiguity regarding the role of the provinces in Canadian foreign policy 
and (b) the increasing relevance of non-central governments in this policy area.’48  
During the Kennedy rounds of GATT negotiations in the 1960s, the evidence of consultation 
between Ottawa and the provinces on issues of international trade negotiation became 
apparent. For example, during this negotiation round, some provinces submitted formal 
reports on tariff policy to the federal government and called for greater involvement in the 
negotiations. Kukucha reports that ‘Ottawa’s response to the provinces for greater 
involvement in negotiations was tentative and there was little indication that it would 
consider an expanded provincial role.’49 Even though Ottawa was still sceptical about the 
involvement of the provinces at this point in time, this marked the birth of channels of 
cooperation between the provinces and Ottawa in relation to international trade negotiations.  
During the Tokyo round of GATT negotiations, the provinces became more active in 
international trade negotiations possibly because international trade norms were becoming 
increasingly interwoven into the domestic space of the Canadian federalism. 50 Kukucha 
reports that:  
By the time the Tokyo Round began in 1973, however, GATT’s focus had shifted to the 
difficult issue of non-tariff barriers (NTBs). Negotiations on visible tariffs were replaced 
by discussions of subsidies, government procurement, and other technical barriers. 
Sectoral negotiations on fisheries, resource-based products, and agriculture also involved 
areas of provincial jurisdiction. This is why the Provinces demanded direct consultation 
with Ottawa. The federal government understood that, given the scope of the issues 
involved, it would need the support of the Provinces in order to negotiate a binding 
international agreement under GATT’s federal state clause.51 
                                                            
48 Kukucha (2008) (n 46) 43. 
49 ibid 47. See also Ann Weston, ‘The Canadian ‘Model’ for Public Participation in Trade Policy Formulation’ 
(August 2005) The North-South Institute, Ottawa, Canada. 12 – 15 <http://www.nsi-ins.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/2005-The-Canadian-model-for-Public-Participation-in-Trade-and-Policy-
Formulation.pdf> accessed 24 June 2016. 
50  Christopher J Kukucha, ‘The Role of the Provinces in Canadian Foreign Trade Policy: Multi-Level 
Governance and Sub-National Interests in the Twenty-First Century’ (2004) 23 (3) Pol & Soc 113, 134. 
51 Kukucha (2008) (n 49) 47. 
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This intrusion of international trade disciplines during the ‘Tokyo round’ of negotiations 
necessitated the strengthening of linkages between Ottawa and the provinces. Canada’s 
commitments under the multilateral trade negotiations of the GATT led to growing concerns 
for the provincial governments over federal policy initiatives that challenged sub-national 
interests.52 In response, the provinces ‘especially Québec, Ontario, and Alberta, began to 
demand a more inclusive role in the formulation of Canadian foreign trade policy.’53 Ottawa 
responded by attempting to institutionalise the interests of the provinces within the Canadian 
international trade mechanism by including a new Federal Provincial Coordination 
Division (FPCD) under the Ministry of External Affairs. The FPCD became responsible for 
keeping the provinces informed of all relevant Canadian international initiatives.54Other 
formal mechanisms for the input of the provinces in international trade negotiations included 
The Canadian Trade and Tariffs Committee (CTTC) introduced during the ‘Tokyo 
round.’55 The CTTC was responsible for gathering briefs from businesses, unions, consumer 
groups, the provinces and other interested parties during the Tokyo Round of negotiations at 
the GATT.56 Subsequently, an ‘…ad hoc federal-provincial committee of deputy ministers 
was established in 1975, which was replaced by a Canadian Coordinator for Trade 
Negotiations (CCTN) in 1977.’57 In 1985, during the build-up to the negotiations of the 
Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) Agreement, ‘The Premiers of British Columbia, 
Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba all announced their support for “full provincial 
participation.”’58 This led to a commitment to continued consultation within the CCTN.59  
After the CUFTA agreement was implemented in 1987, the CCTN metamorphosed into the 
Committee for the Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) with each province having one official 
                                                            
52 Kukucha (2009) (n 47) 35. 
53 ibid.  
54 ibid.  
55  David R Protheroe, Imports and Politics: Trade Decision-Making in Canada, 1968-1979 (Institute for 
Research on Public Policy 1980)156. 
56 Kukucha (2009) (n 54) 36.  
57 ibid.  
58 ibid. 
59 ibid; Patrick Fafard and Patrick Leblond, ‘Twenty-First Century Trade Agreements: Challenges for Canadian 
Federalism’ (2012) The Federal Idea <http://ideefederale.ca/documents/challenges.pdf> accessed 24 June 2016.  
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representative. 60  A series of consultative committees were also instituted within various 
provincial departments to cater for sectorial concerns.61 The use of such committees became 
popular in the central government - provincial relationship on international trade negotiations 
throughout the 1980s.62  For example during negotiations for the NAFTA, an additional 
committee - the Committee for North American Free Trade Negotiations (CNAFTN) 
was introduced along with the CFTA.63  
Although the CNAFTN was tailored specifically for the NAFTA negotiations, it subsequently 
metamorphosed into the Federal-Provincial Territorial Trade Committee (CTRADE) 
system. CTRADE is the current federal – provincial cooperation forum in Canada. It 
involves a series of meetings between Ottawa and the provinces which are held four times 
annually. 64  Both levels of government engage in consultations and information sharing, 
which includes Ottawa making draft documents available to the provinces when Canada 
enters negotiations in areas of provincial jurisdiction.65 ‘The provinces are encouraged to 
provide feedback and guidance on these proposals and federal negotiators are sensitive to the 
economic interests of the provinces.’66In addition to the CTRADE forum, Kukucha identifies 
three other forms of consultation which take place between federal and provincial 
governments on matters relating to international trade:  
First, there is almost always more than one department at the provincial level in contact 
with Ottawa on international trade matters. Many of the larger Provinces have specific 
departments to coordinate CTrade and other foreign trade policy considerations. And 
even where these coordinating mechanisms exist, most Provinces have other officials 
responsible for trade policy in a wide range of departments. Ministries of environment, 
                                                            
60 Fafard and Leblond (n 59) 5-6. See also Axel Hulsemeyer, Globalisation and Institutional Adjustment: 
Federalism as an Obstacle? (Ashgate 2004). 
61 Kukucha (2009) (n 59) 35. 
62 ibid.  
63 ibid. 
64 Kukucha (2008) (n 49) 52. 
65 ibid 54. See also Fafard and Leblond (n 60) 22. 
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agriculture, finance, and forestry all have interests related to international economic 
policy that need to be protected.67  
In summary, cooperation between Ottawa and the provinces on matters relating to 
international trade negotiations has been the most distinct expression of how Canada is 
making adjustments to accommodate sub-national governments as stakeholders in the 
changing landscape of international trade interactions in Canada. There have been calls for 
this model to be transplanted to other policy areas such as labour and the environment.68 In 
addition, constitutional formalisation of the existing channels of cooperation has been 
demanded by some provinces but rejected by Ottawa.69Although the system is without any 
formal constitutional entrenchment, its development over the years has been instrumental to 
maintaining a delicate balance between the provinces and the central government at Ottawa. 
More importantly, this model portrays a perspective about sub-national involvement in 
international interactions which is moderate and cautious. This model will subsequently be 
compared with the next case study – Belgium. 
1.3.2 Belgium in focus  
Belgium is a complex federal country made up of three Communities (the Flemish 
Community, the French Community and the German-speaking Community); three Regions 
(the Flemish Region, the Walloon Region and the Brussels Region); and four linguistic 
regions (the Dutch-speaking region, the French speaking region, the bilingual region of 
Brussels-Capital and the German-speaking region).70 In view of the multifarious composition 
of the Belgian state, the federal system in operation in Belgium has evolved in tandem with 
these peculiar diversities.71  
With regard to the conduct of foreign policy in general, there is a formal constitutional 
structure for shared competence and cooperation among the component units of the Belgian 
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70 See art 1-4 of The Belgian Constitution.  
71  Francoise Massart-Pierad and Peter Bursens, ‘Belgian Federalism and Foreign Relations: Between 
Cooperation and Pragmatism’ in Michelmann (ed) (n 34) 18ff, 19-20. 
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federation.72 This formalized process of cooperation is encapsulated in Art 167 (1) of the 
2007 Belgium Constitution which stipulates inter alia for shared competence between the 
King, Communities and Regions ‘To regulate international cooperation, including the 
concluding of treaties, for those matters that fall within their competences in pursuance of or 
by virtue of the Constitution.’73  
This constitutional arrangement between the components of the Belgian federation has been 
progressively negotiated over time through a series of Special Acts on the Belgian Federal 
State Reform. One notable constitutional milestone in the development of the Belgian foreign 
policy system includes The Institutional Reform Act of 8 August 1988. This Act introduced 
the constitutional principle of in foro interno in foro externo and the absence of hierarchy 
between different levels of administration.74 The terms in foro interno in foro externo are 
Latin phrases which literally mean: in foro interno (‘in the inner court’) and in foro externo 
(‘in the outer court’).75 In the context of foreign policy in foro interno in foro externo are 
used in the context of how the external competences of the regions in Belgium are directly 
correlated with their internal competence under the Belgium constitution.76 According to 
Paquin, the implication of this is that ‘Belgian sub-national governments possess a true 
international legal personality and, in practice, this means that foreign countries and 
international organizations can, if they want, negotiate and conclude real treaties with 
Belgium’s Sub-national governments.’77 
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The revision of the Constitution in 1993 built on the 1988 reform by further adapting the 
organization of Belgium’s cooperation mechanism for international relations along the unique 
configuration of the Belgian federal system.78 This led to the introduction of three distinct 
categories of agreements in Belgium: 1) treaties that exclusively involve the powers of the 
federal government and that are concluded and ratified by this same federal government; 2) 
treaties related exclusively to community or regional powers and that are concluded and 
ratified by communities and regions; and 3) mixed treaties.79 Paquin explains how each 
category of treaties works thus: 
When a treaty project is brought to the attention of the federal government, it must inform 
the other levels of government. The regions and communities can then ask to be a party to 
the treaty if it affects their fields of jurisdiction. It is only after negotiation between the 
various parties that there is a decision about the category of the proposed treaty. 
When an agreement involves federal powers and either community or a regional power at 
the same time, the treaty is concluded according to a special procedure convened among 
the different orders of government. It must also be approved by all of the parliaments 
involved. Mixed treaties require twenty different steps to complete the whole procedure.80 
In the context of international trade relations, these special reforms have empowered the 
regions in Belgium with competences for determining policy with regard to international 
trade in areas such as foreign markets and exports (without prejudice to any national policy to 
coordinate and promote foreign trade and to generally cooperate in that area).81 
This unique approach adopted by Belgium is not without its challenges. Essentially, the 
model of shared competence adopted creates a complex labyrinth of actors and multifaceted 
issues. To cater for these complexities, the constitutional reforms have introduced 
institutional and constitutional checks. For example, the 1993 reform introduced three notable 
constitutional restrictions on the powers of the regions in relation to their activities in the 
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international arena. First, there is the substitution mechanism under art 169 of the 1993 and 
2007 Constitutions. This states that if a region does not adhere to an international or EU 
commitment and it is convicted by an international court, then the central government can 
substitute for the region (but not the other way round) to ensure compliance.82 According to 
Bursens and Massart-Pierad, this restriction was introduced in anticipation that shared 
competence between the regions and the federal government on foreign policy could lead to 
coordination problems.83 Second, it was stipulated in the reform of 1993 that the foreign 
policy activity of the regions must not contradict the broad orientations of the commonly 
agreed foreign policy of the Belgian state (this refers to areas of shared ideology such as 
democracy, national security etc.). 84  Third, the regions and communities are obliged to 
inform the federal government of any foreign activities they are involved in.85  
Another constitutional method adopted to ensure coordination in foreign policy is the use of 
Cooperation Agreements. 86  According to Bursens and Massart-Pierad, Cooperation 
Agreements ‘broadly frame the application of Belgium’s external relations by involving the 
various bodies involved.’87 In essence, these agreements are intended to ensure that all the 
relevant stakeholders to foreign relations in Belgium are carried along regarding the decisions 
made by any particular actor. An example of such a Cooperation Agreement is the one 
between the regions and the federal government, catering for Belgium’s participation in the 
EU Council of Ministers. Under this agreement, ministers of the federative states can 
represent Belgium and conclude agreements in its name.88 
The institutional checks available to ensure coordination on foreign policy are mainly in the 
form of committees which are designed to maximise effective coordination by minimising 
potential friction among stakeholders. For example, there is the Inter-ministerial 
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Committee on Foreign Policy (ICFP).89 The ICFP Secretariat is maintained by the Foreign 
Service in charge of relations with Communities and Regions.90 It does not meet on a regular 
basis with an average of two meetings happening per year.91 Therefore, the system also relies 
on informal meetings between cabinet-level personnel and civil servants from both levels of 
government. 92  The primary objective of this committee is to minimise friction in the 
coordination mechanism on foreign policy by dealing with political conflicts.93 It achieves 
this through a mechanism of dialogue and information exchange between the centre and the 
regions.94 
From the foregoing, it is clear that compliance with international trade norms in Belgium is 
designed to be a product of joint participation by the central government and regional 
governments under a formalised and constitutionally recognised framework. 95  As such, 
Belgium’s compliance with international trade agreements is negotiated by all stakeholders 
and any decision reached is deemed to be the common position of the Belgian state.96  
1.4 Common themes: Cooperation and mutual interests 
From the details of the existing relationships between the provinces/regions and the central 
governments in the two countries discussed above, the differences are obvious. As such, this 
paper will not dwell on these differences. The main focus of this section is to identify 
common themes that unify both case studies.  
First, increased sub-national participation in international trade relations in both countries is 
occurring within the ambit of stronger intergovernmental cooperation, rather than direct 
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unregulated engagement by sub-national governments with foreign governments. 97  Even 
though Belgium has entrenched constitutional provisions to support sub-national engagement 
in foreign affairs while Canada does not, both countries appear to still be cautious about 
direct unregulated engagement of sub-national actors in trade negotiations with foreign states. 
More so, although the scope of cooperation is not restricted only to dialogue in Belgium but 
also extends to ‘permitted policy action’ taken by sub-national governments, these permitted 
policy actions are usually coordinated and supervised by the central government using the 
constitutional mechanisms discussed in the previous section. In essence, the process is still 
controlled by the central government through checks and balances, such as the use of 
cooperation agreements and the constitutional restrictions under art 169 of the Belgian 
Constitution. 
This is an important point because it is a reflection of the difficulty all sub-national 
governments experience attaining legitimacy in the international scene. Essentially, their 
limitations and restrictions come to the fore. Sub-national governments in Belgium are not 
faring better than their counterparts in Canada, even though they have a more formalised 
mandate to engage in the international economic processes. This is also not perceived as a 
triumph of the existing international regime which still frowns on sub-national engagement in 
foreign activities. Rather it is a reflection of the reality that the legitimacy of sub-national 
actors on the international scene is at its infancy. 
Second, the level of engagement between sub-national governments and central governments 
on international trade negotiation (in both countries) is clearly being driven by growing 
mutual interests (between sub-national governments and central governments) on specific 
cross-cutting issues which new breed international economic agreements now cover. Also, 
the level of engagement (between sub-national governments and central governments) in both 
countries is being shaped by the differing priorities attached to specific trade topics.  
To illustrate the significance of this point, this paper draws on Criekeman’s98 arguments 
about the factors that motivate or repel cooperation among levels of government. He 
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distinguishes between ‘conflictual’ and ‘cooperational’ issues, arguing that areas, which are 
‘conflictual’, are usually less amenable to strong cooperation between levels of government.99 
In this instance, the argument in this paper is that both ‘conflictual’ and ‘cooperational’ issues 
are spurring more sub-national engagement in international trade interactions in Canada and 
Belgium. The issues that are conflictual represent the areas in which the sub-national 
governments disagree with the central government and as such are therein agitating for 
different negotiating positions. Cooperational issues on the other hand, are those areas where 
both parties are in agreement or at least amenable to agreement. In such areas, sub-national 
governments are working more closely (in both countries) to achieve common negotiating 
positions.  
The Canadian experience shows that Ottawa (irrespective of the less formal system) has had 
to demonstrate a sense of commitment to implementing the mechanisms for cooperation 
between them and the provincial governments even in areas that are ‘conflictual’ or risk 
having the provinces exploit the loopholes and ambivalence in the constitutional provisions to 
take counterproductive action.100 This could occur if the provinces dissent to the adoption of 
a negotiating position adopted by the central government. As Gerken points out, the power of 
dissent is another way in which the sub-national governments (this encompasses a broader 
scope of minority state and non-state actors in a federal system) can contribute to the policy 
process in federal systems. 101  The effectiveness of dissent as a tool for facilitating 
cooperation in the area of international trade relations is identifiable in the Canadian 
experience. For example, during the Doha multilateral negotiation and the NAFTA 
negotiation processes, the provinces’ objection to certain issues was reflected in the final 
negotiation position adopted by Canada.102 Specifically, Kukucha identifies that the original 
US proposal for art 2.2 of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(SCM), which Washington intended to use as a limitation on the competitive state subsidies 
in Canada, was opposed by Canada because the provinces- specifically Ontario and Quebec- 
opposed it during the negotiation process.103  
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Irrespective of the differences in approach of Canada and Belgium, another area of 
commonality is that both systems are designed to explore practical methods for balancing 
national and state power in relation to specific subject areas, which are of mutual interest to 
both levels of government. This shifts the focus from regulatory autonomy and potentially 
reduces the possibility of clamours for secession within these States. Both systems place 
emphasis on the need for sub-national participation in the policy formulation process, instead 
of pursuing state regulatory autonomy.104 ‘This way, states thereby gain ex ante and ex post 
opportunities to influence federal law…’105  without necessarily undermining the delicate 
fabric of the federal relationship. Although this makes the process flexible and open to both 
formal and informal methods for achieving mutual agreement on policy issues,106 this also 
portrays how premature it is to imagine that any State will totally open up the policy space 
for their sub-national governments to have a full and unrestricted mandate in international 
trade relations.  
 
1.5 Conclusion: Implications for the future 
As was pointed out in the analysis on how federal systems have impacted the design and 
evolution of international trade rules, sub-national governments and foreign economic 
interactions are ordinarily perceived as ‘strange bedfellows’. As such, it is possible to down 
play the significance of sub-national engagement in the international scene because they are 
still largely nuanced expressions occurring mainly within the domestic settings of their home 
states. The danger with such assumptions is that we could miss the distinct patterns, which 
should draw our attention to the opportunities and challenges that are associated with this 
emerging phenomenon. When engaged in conversations with people about my area of 
research, it seems amusing to some to even suggest that sub-national governments have a role 
to play in international trade (either as actors or regulators). The reality is that sub-national 
governments will always struggle to project themselves as distinct international trade 
stakeholders because their engagement in this sphere is undoubtedly fraught with challenges. 
However, the case studies in this paper should remind us that the world where sub-national 
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governments were unwelcome in international affairs is firmly in the past. There is enough 
evidence to suggest that sub-national activism is going to increase in correlation to the 
expanding scope of international economic agreements. Hence, it is imperative to develop a 
fresh perspective towards conceptualising their role in the evolving international trade 
process. More importantly, the experiences in Canada and Belgium demonstrate how two 
very dissimilar domestic models of assimilation can have distinguishable strands that unify 
them. It is important going forward to map the areas of mutuality and coherence between 
different case studies, so as to develop a holistic view of how sub-national governments 
positively and negatively impact on the evolving international economic landscape.  
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